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Abstract:
As data traffic in terrestrial-satellite systems surges, the integration of power allocation for caching, computing,
and communication (3C) has attracted much research attention. However, previous works on 3C power
allocation in terrestrial-satellite systems mostly focus on maximizing the overall system throughput. In this
paper, we aim to guarantee both throughput fairness and data security in terrestrial-satellite systems.

Specifically, we first divide the system implementation into three steps, i.e., data accumulation, blockchain
computing, and wireless transmission. Then, we model and analyze the delay and power consumption in each
step by proposing several theorems and lemmas regarding 3C power allocation. Based on the theorems and
lemmas, we further formulate the problem of 3C power allocation as a Nash bargaining game and construct an
optimization model for the game. Last, we solve the optimization problem using dual decomposition and obtain
the optimal period of the satellite serving the ground stations as well as the optimal 3C power allocation
solution. The optimal solution can provide guidelines for parameter configuration in terrestrial-satellite systems.
The performance of the proposed terrestrial-satellite architecture is verified by extensive simulations.

SECTION I. Introduction
Terrestrial-satellite systems [1]–[2][3][4][5] enable seamless coverage for ground users in a wide area [6]. This
makes it very promising in the next generation of networks, especially in the scenarios of Internet of Things (IoT)
and vehicle network, etc. Existing research on the performance of terrestrial-satellite systems has mostly
focused on improving throughput [7], [8] by relatively fixed allocation of caching, computing, and
communication resources.
However, from the perspective of enhancing user experience in terrestrial-satellite systems, fairness [9]–
[10][11] and security [12]–[13][14][15][16][17][18] are two critical issues that should not be overlooked.
Especially, 3C (caching, computing [19], [20], and communication [21]) resource allocation involved in terrestrialsatellite systems providing fair and secure services is a hot topic effecting system performance.
Several existing works [9]–[10][11] have employed Nash bargaining game to provide user throughput fairness in
wireless networks. Gao et al. consider user fairness based on Nash bargaining in a multiuser resource allocation
game [9], where users with different quality of service (QoS) requirements achieve different throughput. This
can effectively motivate users to cooperate to obtain a fair and improved network service for all.
Ni et al. provide the joint channel and power allocation optimization in a wireless network based on Nash
bargaining game [10]. Zhang et al. further consider imperfect wireless channel state information in a Nash
bargaining game [11]. Bairagi et al. solve the issue of coexistence between two wireless systems based on a
Nash bargaining game [22]. Xu et al. employ Nash bargaining to guarantee user fairness in mobile social
networks [23]. These works focus on the performance of system throughput with fairness awareness. The
impact of 3C resource management on the system performance is not considered.
In terms of data security in wireless systems, blockchain [12], [13], [15]–[16][17], [24] has attracted extensive
attentions from both the academia and the industry. Tschorsch et al. introduce the development history of
blockchain [24]. Fu et al. employ blockchain to guarantee data security in IoT [14]. Although 3C resource
allocation and blockchain based data caching are studied in [14] to guarantee data security, integrated
terrestrial-satellite system is not considered. Yang et al. propose a trust management mechanism for vehicular
networks based on blockchain [12]. However, the above works focus on the blockchain based security
mechanism, where the impact of 3C resource management on the blockchain based integrated terrestrialsatellite system is not considered.
Although many existing works have contributed to user fairness and data security in wireless systems, power
allocation for each of the 3C is generally studied separately. However, for terrestrial-satellite systems, such
separate 3C power allocation may lead to low resource utility decreasing the performance, considering the long
distance between ground stations and satellites.
Motivated by the above observation, we propose a novel terrestrial-satellite network architecture with fairness
and security awareness, and formulate a joint optimization of satellite serving period and 3C power allocation in
this paper. Specifically, we first formulate a terrestrial-satellite model, where low earth orbit (LEO) satellites will

collect traffic data from ground stations periodically. In this paper, one period of the satellite serving the ground
stations may contain multiple LEO satellite period around the earth.
Then, we divide the system implementation into three steps: traffic accumulation, computing, and wireless
transmission, corresponding to caching, computing, and communication in 3C, respectively. In the traffic
accumulation step, data is collected and accumulated as one data block. In the computing step, the ground
station will continually calculate the hash value of the block with a random variable called “nonce”. When the
hash value is smaller than a threshold, the block can be reported to the LEO satellite in the wireless transmission
step and added to the blockchain. We study the relationship between the delay in the three steps and the
power consumption of 3C. Moreover, we can formulate the overall system power consumption under a maximal
power constraint. Under the maximal power constraint, the period of the satellites serving the ground stations
and the 3C power consumption will be jointly optimized.
Furthermore, we formulate the Nash bargaining framework for the considered terrestrial-satellite system. In the
proposed model, Nash bargaining game guarantees fairness in the 3C power allocation. We demonstrate the
existence and uniqueness of the Nash bargaining solution in the formulated game to find the bargaining solution
using dual decomposition.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
•

We reveal the relationship between the power consumption of 3C and the corresponding delay in the
terrestrial-satellite system. We study that how the power allocation of 3C effects each other,
considering fairness and security in the system. We provide several theorems and lemmas on 3C power
allocation to explore the insights in optimizing the system performance.

•

We propose a novel terrestrial-satellite architecture with fairness and security awareness. We formulate
a Nash bargaining framework based optimization model for the considered terrestrial-satellite system.

•

We obtain the optimal period of the satellites serving the ground stations and the optimal 3C power
allocation. The solution provides guidelines for both the engineering implementation and the theoretical
analysis of a fair and secure terrestrial-satellite system.

It is notably that besides fairness and security in an integrated terrestrial-satellite system, several other system
performance evaluation criteria [25]–[26][27][28] should also be considered such as placement of controllers
and gateways [25], service offloading [28], etc. In this paper, we do not consider these criteria due to the limited
space, which will be considered in our future work. On the other hand, although the solving methods used in
this work have been used in several existing works, such as the methods solving bargain game in [10], [11], the
optimization problem considered in this work is totally different with the existing works.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model and the problem
formulation. Section III solves the considered model by dual decomposition. Numerical results demonstrate the
performance of the proposed architecture and solution in terms of user fairness and data security in Section IV.
We conclude the paper in Section V.

SECTION II. System Model and Problem Formulation
A. LEO Satellite Orbit Model

The LEO satellite orbit is shown in Fig. 1. The circular orbit is assumed in this paper. 𝑁𝑁 ground stations are
located at ground, which are served by the same satellite. Denote the radius of earth by 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 . We assume that the
distance between the satellite and all ground stations is identical and equal to 𝐿𝐿. Similarly, the minimal elevation

angle 𝑉𝑉 and the geocentric angle α from any ground station to the satellite are also identical. Then, it can be
shown that 𝛼𝛼 is
𝛼𝛼 = arccos �

(1)

𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸
cos 𝑉𝑉� − 𝑉𝑉.
𝐿𝐿 + 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸

In Fig. 1, the satellite can serve the ground station continuously up to 2𝛼𝛼 range of the geocentric angle.
According to the Kepler's second law, the orbital period of the satellite around the earth, 𝑇𝑇 LEO, is

𝑇𝑇

(2)

LEO

= 2𝜋𝜋�

(𝐿𝐿 + 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 )3
,
𝜇𝜇

where 𝜇𝜇 = 398,601.58km3 /s2 is the Kepler constant. Then, the available continuous serving time, referred to
as the time window, of the satellite in each orbital period is
~

𝑇𝑇

(3)

=

2𝛼𝛼 LEO
𝑇𝑇
2𝜋𝜋

(𝐿𝐿 + 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 )3
𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸
= 2 �arccos �
cos 𝑉𝑉� − 𝑉𝑉� �
.
𝐿𝐿 + 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸
𝜇𝜇

Fig. 1. LEO satellite orbit model.
In practice, each ground station connects to multiple data gathering devices. The data gathering devices
accumulate traffic data and send the data to the ground station, which plays the role of as the data gateway.
After data processing, the ground station transmits the data to its serving satellite in its time window
periodically. In this paper, one serving period of the satellite can be a multiple of its orbital periods, i.e. 𝑇𝑇 LEO.
Moreover, the satellite can serve at most one of the 𝑁𝑁 ground stations in each orbital period. On average, each
ground station is served in an orbital period with a certain probability. We will discuss this in details in Subsection II-B.

B. Blockchain Model

Blockchain can effectively enhance data security in a network. The user data can be stored and relayed in the
satellite network to meet the traffic demand across the network. Take IoT data as one instance: the categories
of IoT companies include the raw material acquisition, manufacturing process, production transportation, and
production transactions. The IoT data generated by each company is gathered by the ground station serving the
company and sent to the corresponding satellite. Thereafter, the data will be recorded into the blockchain at
each satellite to guarantee the data security [14] in the satellite network.
The structure of the blockchain is shown in Fig. 2. Each block contains the caching address of the data block, a
hash value, a nonce, and a hash value in the previous block. In practice, the block data may be stored and
relayed in different satellites. The blockchain contains only the caching address of the data block instead of the
whole data block itself. However, the generation of the hash value is still based on the data block, the nonce,
and the hash value in the previous block. Note that satellite relay can be used when a ground station is out of
the coverage area of a LEO satellite. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper, and we may study this in
our future works.

Fig. 2. The connection of blocks in the blockchain.
3C in the blockchain is shown in Fig. 3. The ground station contains data loading cache for accumulating the
block data. The computing servers are employed for blockchain computing, where the larger capacity of the
computing servers can lead to the lower computing delay. The block is generated by the correct nonce, based on
which the hash value should meet the hash threshold. Then, the block will be cached in the data transmission
cache for wireless transmission when the satellite serves the ground station. The cache resource is limited by
the wireless transmission capacity that we will discussed later, the computing resource is limited by the demand
of blockchain computing, and the wireless transmission power is limited by the LEO satellite orbit as in Section
II-A.

Fig. 3. The proposed terrestrial-satellite architecture and the 3C in it.
The three system steps can be described as in Fig. 4. For ground station i, the system steps can consist of the
traffic accumulation with 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 seconds, blockchain computing with 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 seconds, and the wireless transmission
with 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 seconds. In order to avoid data overflow in the cache, we have 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴. Since the
~

wireless transmission must be in the time window, we have 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 ≤ 𝑇𝑇 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 , considering that a transmission
service can happen every several orbital periods. Obviously, the three steps have the same period 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 .

Fig. 4. System steps.
In terms of caching in the 3C [29]–[30][31][32][33][34], the data loading cache is used to store the traffic data at
the ground station. The demanded capacity of caches in the three steps should be the same as the length of the
block for wireless transmission. We assume that the wireless channel bandwidth of the ground station is 𝐵𝐵 Hz,
where the Gaussian white noise power is 𝜎𝜎 2 watt (W). Assume that the wireless channel gain from the ground
station 𝑖𝑖 to the satellite is |ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2 , and the wireless transmission power of the ground station is 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 . Then, the
transmission rate of the ground station i, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 , is

(4)

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 |ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵 log 2 �1 +
�,
𝜎𝜎 2

and the length of the block sent in the transmission time 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 is 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 . The implementation of data processing is
continuous and circulatory. After the data is accumulated to 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 bits in the data loading cache, the data will
be cached in the computing server for generating the block. Finally, the block will be cached in the data
transmission cache for wireless transmission as in Fig. 3.

In practice, the amount of cache in usage can be configured based on the maximal length of the data block. We
denote the power consumption of caching by 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 W/bit, and the maximal average power consumption at each
~

ground station by 𝑃𝑃max . We know that the maximal continuous wireless serving time of the ground stations is 𝑇𝑇.
Then, the size of the required cache is the same in the three steps in Fig. 4. We introduce Lemma 1 to derive the
length of cache.
Lemma 1:
The maximal length of cache per step configured at the i-th ground station is
~

𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 log 2 �1 +

Proof:

𝑃𝑃max 𝑇𝑇 LEO |ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2
~

𝑇𝑇𝜎𝜎 2

�.

With the maximal average power 𝑃𝑃max during 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 , the maximal length of the cache per step in Fig. 4 can be
determined by the case of maximizing the average user throughput:

~

𝑃𝑃max 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 |ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2
𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴 log 2 �1 +
�,
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 𝜎𝜎 2

where 𝑇𝑇 LEO ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 ≤ 𝑇𝑇. Next, we optimize 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 to obtain the upper bound of 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 . It can be proved
that 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is monotonously decreasing with 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 , and thus we have 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 = 𝑇𝑇 LEO for maximizing 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 . Likewise, we can
~

further prove that 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is monotonously increasing with 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 , then, we can have 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 = 𝑇𝑇 for maximizing 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 .
Therefore, the length of the cache per step configured at the 𝑖𝑖-th ground station is
~

𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 log 2 �1 +

𝑃𝑃max 𝑇𝑇 LEO |ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2
~

𝑇𝑇𝜎𝜎 2

�.

~

In the above equation, 𝑃𝑃max 𝑇𝑇 LEO is the total energy consumption in one orbital period, and thus 𝑃𝑃max 𝑇𝑇 LEO /𝑇𝑇 is
~

the upper bound of power consumption for wireless transmission in 𝑇𝑇. This equation indicates the upper bound
of cache in each step, because that 𝑃𝑃max is used for caching, computing, as well as communication, other than
only for caching.■
Based on Lemma 1, the overall power consumption of the cache in the ground station 𝑖𝑖 is
𝑆𝑆
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖

(5)
𝑆𝑆

~

= 3𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 = 3𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 log 2 �1 +

𝑃𝑃max 𝑇𝑇 LEO |ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2
~

𝑇𝑇𝜎𝜎 2

�.

In practice, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is the upper bound of the caching power consumption. In this paper, the cache with
capacity 3𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 is configured to rapidly caching the traffic data as an simplification in the system model. This
approximation is based on the low cost of cache resource in practice. The caching power consumption based on
the real-time cached data size and queuing theory will be studied in our future work.
In terms of computing in the 3C [35]–[36][37], the computing delay for generating the correct nonce to report
the block is 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 . The variable nonce is generally found from a mathematical problem, and its value can be

changed iteratively [12]. When the hash value of the block and the nonce value is below the pre-determined
hash threshold, the block in the computing server can be transmitted to the satellite by the ground station. We
define the threshold of the hash value by 𝑀𝑀0 for each ground station, and the computing capacity of the 𝑖𝑖-th
ground station by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 cycles per second (cps). Obviously, the hash value 𝑀𝑀 for generating and transmitting the
block to the satellite should meet 𝑀𝑀 ≤ 𝑀𝑀0 . This leads to the fair opportunity of generating the correct nonce
with the same hash algorithm in each ground station. In this paper, we assume that the average number of
iterations to generate the correct nonce meeting 𝑀𝑀 ≤ 𝑀𝑀0 is the same in each ground station and denoted by 𝜔𝜔.
We denote the average number of CPU cycles in the computing server demanded for solving the hash function
at a time by 𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 cycles. Then, 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 meets
(6)
Considering that 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴, we have

(7)

𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 =

𝜔𝜔𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻
.
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖

𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ≥

𝜔𝜔𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻
.
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴

In terms of communication in the 3C, we focus on the wireless transmission of the ground stations in this paper.
As in eq. (4), the transmission rate of the ground station 𝑖𝑖 is 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 in the transmission time 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 per period of the
transmission 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 . This indicates that the average power consumption of the wireless transmission is
𝑊𝑊
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖

(8)

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊
=
,
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴

where the period of the wireless transmission (i.e., serving period) should meet

𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 = 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇 LEO , 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ≥ 1, ∀𝑖𝑖.

(9)

In eq. (9), 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 is a positive integer meeting 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ≥ 1. The ground station may transmit the wireless data once in
every multiple orbital periods of the LEO satellite. Eq. (9) guarantees that the time of the wireless transmission
at the ground station can always fall into its time window. Besides, by eq. (9), we have
~

~

because 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 = 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇 LEO ≥ 𝑇𝑇 LEO > 𝑇𝑇.

~

𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 ≤ min �𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 , 𝑇𝑇� = 𝑇𝑇.
~

In order to determine the �0 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 ≤ 𝑇𝑇� that maximizes the wireless transmission throughput, we introduce

Lemma 2.

Lemma 2:

~

The optimal 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 that maximizes 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 = 𝑇𝑇.
Proof:

When the energy of the ground stations is fixed, the transmission power consumption in the time 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 is 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 =
𝐸𝐸

𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊

. The corresponding amount of transmitted data can be expressed by

𝖱𝖱�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 , 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 �

=

𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 𝐵𝐵 log 2 �1

𝐸𝐸|ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2
+ 𝑊𝑊 2 � ,
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎

where 𝐵𝐵 is the wireless bandwidth. It can be proved that 𝖱𝖱(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 , 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 ) is increasing with 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 . This suggests that
~

when 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 = 𝑇𝑇, 𝖱𝖱(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 , 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 ) can be maximized. ■
~

𝑊𝑊

From Lemma 2, we have 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 = 𝑇𝑇. This derives that 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 =

~

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 𝑇𝑇
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴

.
𝐶𝐶

Next, we study the average power consumption of the computing server 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 . Assume that the power of the
𝐶𝐶

computing server is 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 W/cps. Then, the average power consumption of the computing server is 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 =
𝐶𝐶

further determine the variable 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 in 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , we introduce Lemma 3.

Lemma 3:
𝐶𝐶

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 =

𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻

Proof:

𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴

, and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 =

𝜔𝜔𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴

𝐶𝐶

𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴

. To

.

It can be proved that 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 =

𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴

=

𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴

. Besides, the computing resource denoted by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 should be minimized

to save system cost. According to (7), we have 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ≥
of 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 .■

𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶

𝜔𝜔𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴

, which indicates that 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 =

𝜔𝜔𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴

is the minimal value

~

In eq. (9), we first relax the integer variable 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 to a continuous variable 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 . After the optimization, the real
~

number 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 can be dealt as the average number of 𝑇𝑇 LEO for the satellite serving the ground station 𝑖𝑖. By the
maximal average power constraint at each ground station 𝑃𝑃max , we can obtain the constraint (10) as
𝑆𝑆

𝐶𝐶

𝑊𝑊

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 =

(10)

3𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 +
~

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 𝑇𝑇

𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝜔𝜔𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻
~

𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇 LEO

+~
≤ 𝑃𝑃max .
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇 LEO

~

Besides, considering that the satellite can serve at most one ground station in each orbital period and 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ≥ 1,
we can obtain the following constraint:

𝑁𝑁

1
�~ ≤ 1.
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1

(11)

~

Since the satellite can serve at most one ground station in each orbital period, 1/𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 denotes the probability that
the satellite serves for the ground station i in an arbitrary orbital period of the satellite. By the
constraints (10) and (11), the power allocation of caching, computing, and the communication can be integrated
by the maximal available power 𝑃𝑃max .

C. Nash Bargaining Game Based Terrestrial-Satellite System Model

In this paper, we formulate the system objective by the Nash bargaining game model. Let 𝛀𝛀 be a closed and
convex subset denoting the set of feasible allocations that the players can obtain if they cooperate. We denote
^

the utility function of the 𝑖𝑖-th player in game by 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑁𝑁. Define 𝑼𝑼min = �𝑈𝑈1min , 𝑈𝑈2min , … , 𝑈𝑈 min
^ � as the
^

^

𝑁𝑁

minimal gains of the 𝑁𝑁 players. Then, (𝛀𝛀, 𝑼𝑼min ) constitutes the 𝑁𝑁-player Nash bargaining game. The key issue in
Nash bargaining game is to find a Pareto efficient solution, from which no improvement for a subset of users can
be attained without decreasing the utilities of other users. [11], [34]. Nash bargaining game has a unique fair
Pareto optimal solution catering for the following axioms in Definition 1.
Definition 1 ([11]):
Define 𝕊𝕊(𝛀𝛀, 𝑼𝑼min ) as the Nash bargaining game solution. Then, the properties of the Nash bargaining solution
(NBS) 𝝓𝝓 = 𝕊𝕊(𝛀𝛀, 𝑼𝑼min ) are given by the following six axioms:
1. 𝜙𝜙 is Pareto optimal.

2. Feasibility, i.e., 𝜙𝜙 ∈ 𝛺𝛺.

3. 𝜙𝜙 guarantees the minimal utility Umin.

4. 𝜙𝜙 guarantees the fairness by the independence of irrelevant alternatives. This indicates that if 𝝓𝝓 ∈ 𝛀𝛀′ ⊂
𝛀𝛀, and 𝝓𝝓 = 𝕊𝕊(𝛀𝛀, 𝑼𝑼min ), then 𝝓𝝓 = 𝕊𝕊(𝛀𝛀,′ 𝑼𝑼min ).

5. Independence of liner transformations. For a linear scale transformation ℏ, ℏ(𝕊𝕊(𝛀𝛀, 𝑼𝑼min )) =
𝕊𝕊(ℏ(𝛀𝛀), ℏ(𝑼𝑼min )).

6. 𝜙𝜙 guarantees the symmetry. Define the 𝑖𝑖-th player possesses the NBS 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 in 𝜙𝜙. If the 𝑖𝑖-th player and
the 𝑗𝑗-th player have the same minimal utility in 𝑼𝑼min , i.e., 𝑼𝑼min
= 𝑼𝑼𝑗𝑗min , then, 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 = 𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗 . This effectively
𝑖𝑖
guarantees that all the players have the same priorities.

Axiom 5) indicates that the NBS is scale invariant. Axiom 6) suggests that the players with the same minimal
demand of utility and the utility function will obtain the same utility. This guarantees fairness among the players.
Hence, by Nash bargaining game, we can provide the ground stations with fair service.
Next, we design the system model maximizing Nash bargaining throughput in terrestrial-satellite system. We
~
define 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 = 1/𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 , where 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 can be regarded as the time-sharing factor [11], i.e., the proportion of time that the

~

ground station 𝑖𝑖 occupies the time window of the satellite in an arbitrary orbital period. We also define 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 =

𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 leading to 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 =

~

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖

. Then, we can design the system objective as
𝑁𝑁

~

𝑇𝑇
= � ln � 𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min �
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
Υ
𝑊𝑊
𝝃𝝃,𝑷𝑷

𝑖𝑖=1

𝑁𝑁

~

~

𝑇𝑇𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 |ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2
= � ln � LEO 𝐵𝐵 log 2 �1 +
� − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min � ,
2
𝑇𝑇
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎
𝑖𝑖=1

(12)

where ξ={ξi}, PW={P˜Wi}, and {𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min } denotes the minimal required average throughput of the ground station 𝑖𝑖.
~

By 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 = 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 , we have

𝑊𝑊
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖

~

~

~

~

~

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 𝑇𝑇
= LEO = LEO .
𝑇𝑇
𝑇𝑇

The constraints (10) and (11) can be re-written as follows,
𝑆𝑆

𝐶𝐶

𝑊𝑊

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖

𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜔𝜔𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 𝑇𝑇
= 3𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 +
+ LEO ≤ 𝑃𝑃max , ∀𝑖𝑖.
𝑇𝑇 LEO
𝑇𝑇
𝑁𝑁

� 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 ≤ 1 .
𝑖𝑖=1

(C1)(C2)

Eq. (C2) indicates that each orbital period of the satellite can serve at most one ground station.
~

Since 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 are nonnegative, we have
(C3)

~

𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 ≥ 0, ∀𝑖𝑖.

In eq. (C3), the ground station i never transmits to the satellite if 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 = 0. Then, the system model can be
formulated by

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑊𝑊
𝝃𝝃,𝑷𝑷

s.t.

Υ,

(C1),(C2)and(C3).

(13a)(13b)
𝑁𝑁

~

~

𝑇𝑇𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 |ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2
𝑊𝑊
𝕃𝕃(𝝃𝝃, 𝑷𝑷 , 𝓧𝓧, 𝒴𝒴) = � ln � LEO 𝐵𝐵 log 2 �1 +
� − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min �
𝑇𝑇
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎 2
𝑖𝑖=1

(14)

𝑁𝑁

𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜔𝜔𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻
+ � 𝒳𝒳𝑖𝑖 �𝑃𝑃max − 3𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 −
−
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖LEO
𝑖𝑖=1

~

~
𝑊𝑊
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇
�+
𝑇𝑇 LEO

𝑁𝑁

𝒴𝒴 �1 − � 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 �
𝑖𝑖=1

Theorem 1:
The problem (13a) is a convex optimization problem.
Proof:
It can be proved that the Hessian matrix of 𝛶𝛶 in eq. (13a) over {𝝃𝝃, 𝑷𝑷𝑊𝑊 } is negative semidefinite. This suggests
that the objective in eq. (13a) is concave. Besides, we can also prove that the constraints (C1), (C2) and (C3) are
all convex. Hence, problem (13a)–(13b) is a convex optimization problem. ■
By Theorem 1, the utility in (13a) is concave and injective. Besides, all the intersetion of the convex sets
in (13a) is also a convex set. Then, it is proved that the proposed optimization model in (13a)–(13b) caters for
the 6 axioms in Definition 1. Therefore, the proposed optimization model (13a)–(13b) meets Nash bargaining
game theoretical architecture, and a unique Nash bargaining solution exists. Furthermore, we can employ dual
decomposition to obtain the optimal solution.

SECTION III. The Optimal Resource Allocation by the Dual Decomposition
A. Solution of the Nash Bargaining Based Optimization

In this section, we solve the optimization problem in (13a)–(13b) by dual decomposition method. Since the
duality gap between the optimization model in eqs. (13a)–(13b) and its dual problem is zero, we can just solve
the dual problem [11]. We define the Lagrange multiplier vectors 𝓧𝓧 = {𝒳𝒳𝑖𝑖 } and the Lagrange multiplier 𝒴𝒴 .
Obviously, the Lagrangian of the function in eqs. (13a)–(13b) can be formulated by eq. (14) shown at the bottom
of this page. Moreover, in this paper, to solve eq. (14), we can first solve the inner layer problem in eq. (15) to
obtain the resource allocation policy, and then solve the outer layer problem in eq. (15) to compute the dual
variables iteratively,

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

𝓧𝓧,𝒴𝒴≥0

=

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝕃𝕃(𝝃𝝃, 𝑷𝑷𝑊𝑊 , 𝓧𝓧, 𝒴𝒴)
𝑊𝑊
𝝃𝝃,𝑷𝑷
𝑁𝑁

� 𝒳𝒳𝑖𝑖 (𝑃𝑃max − 3𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 ) + 𝒴𝒴
𝑖𝑖=1

+Ψ(𝝃𝝃, 𝑷𝑷𝑊𝑊 , 𝓧𝓧, 𝒴𝒴),

(15)
𝑁𝑁

~

𝑁𝑁

~

~

~

𝑁𝑁

𝑇𝑇𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 |ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜔𝜔𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 𝑇𝑇
min
𝑊𝑊
Ψ(𝝃𝝃, 𝑷𝑷 , 𝓧𝓧, 𝒴𝒴) = � ln � LEO 𝐵𝐵 log 2 �1 +
� − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 � − � 𝒳𝒳𝑖𝑖 �
+ LEO � − 𝒴𝒴 � 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎 2
𝑇𝑇 LEO
𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖=1

(16)

𝑖𝑖=1

𝑖𝑖=1

where Ψ(𝝃𝝃, 𝑷𝑷𝑊𝑊 , 𝓧𝓧, 𝒴𝒴) is formulated in eq. (16) shown at the bottom of this page. Then, given Lagrange
multipliers, Ψ(𝝃𝝃, 𝑷𝑷𝑊𝑊 , 𝓧𝓧, 𝒴𝒴) can be optimized by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. The optimal dual
variables 𝓧𝓧 and 𝒴𝒴 can be obtained by the ellipsolid and subgradient methods, etc.
~

We can obtain the optimal 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 for a specific ground station 𝑖𝑖 using the following result.

Theorem 2:

~

The optimal power 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 for a specific ground station 𝑖𝑖 is
~

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊

where

+
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎 2
𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖
−
1�
=
exp
2
,
�Γ
��
�𝑊𝑊�ln
|ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2 𝑖𝑖

Γ𝑖𝑖

=2

𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖

=

𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min 𝑇𝑇 LEO
~

,
|ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖LEO
𝑇𝑇 𝐵𝐵𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖

(𝑥𝑥)+ = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(0, 𝑥𝑥), and 𝑊𝑊(⋅) denotes the Lambert-W function.

Proof:

We define 𝜚𝜚𝑖𝑖 = 1 +

~

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 |ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎 2

~

ln 2𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎 2 𝒳𝒳𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇Γ𝑖𝑖

,

~

. By the first derivative of Ψ(𝝃𝝃, 𝑷𝑷𝑊𝑊 , 𝓧𝓧, 𝒴𝒴) in eq. (16) with respect to 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 , we have

∂Ψ(𝝃𝝃, 𝑷𝑷𝑊𝑊 , 𝓧𝓧, 𝒴𝒴)
~

×
Furthermore, we define Γ𝑖𝑖 = 2

LEO
𝑅𝑅min
𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇
~
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖

~

∂𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊

1
𝜚𝜚𝑖𝑖

~

𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵
|ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2
LEO
= 𝑇𝑇
ln 2𝜎𝜎 2

𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵
𝜉𝜉 log (𝜚𝜚 ) − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min
𝑇𝑇 LEO 𝑖𝑖 2 𝑖𝑖

. Then, we can derive that

~

𝒳𝒳𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇
− LEO = 0.
𝑇𝑇

𝜚𝜚𝑖𝑖

𝜚𝜚𝑖𝑖 Γ𝑖𝑖
� � = 2𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖 ,
Γ𝑖𝑖

where

𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖 =

𝜚𝜚

ln

By the Lambert-W function, Γ𝑖𝑖 can be expressed by
𝑖𝑖

|ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2 𝑇𝑇 LEO

~ .
2
2𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎 𝒳𝒳𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇Γ𝑖𝑖

𝜚𝜚𝑖𝑖
= exp �𝑊𝑊�ln 2𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖 ��,
Γ𝑖𝑖

where 𝑊𝑊(⋅) denotes the Lambert-W function. Substituting 𝜚𝜚𝑖𝑖 by 𝜚𝜚𝑖𝑖 = 1 +
~

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊

(17)
This proves Theorem 2. ■

~

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 |ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎 2

, we have

+
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎 2
𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖
=
�Γ exp �𝑊𝑊�ln 2 �� − 1� .
|ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2 𝑖𝑖
~

By Theorem 2, we can obtain the optimal power allocation 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 . Likewise, by taking the first derivative
of Ψ(𝝃𝝃, 𝑷𝑷𝑊𝑊 , 𝓧𝓧, 𝒴𝒴) with respect to 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 , we can obtain the optimal 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3:

We define Ç(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 ) =

∂Υ
.
∂𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖

Then, Ç(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 ) has its invertible function Ç−1 (⋅) when 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min . The optimal 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 is

𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 = C−1 (𝒳𝒳𝑖𝑖

Proof:
Define Ç(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 ) =

∂Υ
,
∂𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖

we can derive that

C(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 ) =
(18)
It can be proved that when

log 2 �1 +

𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻
+ 𝒴𝒴).
𝑇𝑇 LEO

~

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 |ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2
�−
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎 2
~

~

~

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 |ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2

ln 2 �𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 �ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎 2 �

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 |ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min 𝑇𝑇 LEO
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 log 2 �1 +
�− ~
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎 2
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵

.

~

Ç(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 ) > 0 and

∂C(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 )
∂𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖

~

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 |ℎ𝑖𝑖 |2
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵
log 2 �1 +
� > 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min ,
LEO
2
𝑇𝑇
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎

< 0. Hence Ç(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 ) is strictly decreasing with 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 , and its invertible function Ç−1 (⋅) exists. By

the first derivative of Ψ(𝝃𝝃, 𝑷𝑷𝑊𝑊 , 𝓧𝓧, 𝒴𝒴) in eq. (16) with respect to 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 , we have 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 = C−1 �𝒳𝒳𝑖𝑖

B. Determine the Dual Variables

By eq. (15), the subgradient of 𝒳𝒳𝑖𝑖 and 𝒴𝒴 can be represented by

~

𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻
𝑇𝑇 LEO

+ 𝒴𝒴�. ■

~

𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜔𝜔𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 𝑇𝑇
�𝑃𝑃max − 3𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 −
− LEO �,
𝑇𝑇 LEO
𝑇𝑇

and

𝑁𝑁

�1 − � 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 �,
𝑖𝑖=1

respectively.
~

Given 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 and 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 based on Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, the outer layer primal problem in eq. (15) can be solved
by the gradient method. Then, the dual variables can be updated as follows:

𝒳𝒳𝑖𝑖 (𝑙𝑙 + 1) = (𝒳𝒳𝑖𝑖 (𝑙𝑙) − ℓ1 (𝑙𝑙)(𝑃𝑃max − 3𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆
−

(19)(20)

𝒴𝒴(𝑙𝑙 + 1) =

𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 𝜔𝜔𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻
−
𝑇𝑇 LEO

+
~
𝑊𝑊
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇
�� , ∀𝑖𝑖,
𝑇𝑇 LEO
~

𝑁𝑁

+

�𝒴𝒴 (𝑙𝑙) − ℓ2 (𝑙𝑙) �1 − � 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 �� ,
𝑖𝑖=1

where ℓ1 (𝑙𝑙) and ℓ2 (𝑙𝑙) are the positive step size at the iteration 𝑙𝑙. Since the optimal objective (13a) is concave,
the iteration can converge to the global optimal solution with an appropriate step size [11].

C. The Algorithm Implementation

By Theorem 2, Theorem 3, and eqs. (19)–(20), we can obtain the global optimal {𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 } and {𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 } in an iterative
manner. We propose the corresponding algorithm in Algorithm 1, called adaptive period of transmission (APT)
algorithm.
By Algorithm 1, the satellite serving period and 3C power allocation can be optimized in an integrated process.
The convergence of the subgradient method based Algorithm 1 depends on the specific function, the number of
variables, as well as the selection of step size, etc. In this paper, we can implement Algorithm 1 because that the

number of variables is relatively small. More details about the computational complexity of subgradient method
can be found in [38].

SECTION IV. Numerical Results

In the simulation section, we set the noise temperature to be 260 K, and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min = 𝑅𝑅0 /𝑖𝑖, ∀𝑖𝑖, where 𝑅𝑅0 is a constant
given in Table I. We employ the path loss model

SECTION Algorithm 1:
Implementation of the APT Algorithm.
Input:
Initialize 𝑙𝑙 = 0; initialize the sets of {𝒳𝒳𝑖𝑖 (0)} and 𝒴𝒴(0); initialize ℓ1 (0) and ℓ2 (0); initialize a very small
constant 𝛿𝛿 > 0.
Output:
{𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 } and {𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 }.
~

~

while �𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 (𝑙𝑙) − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 (𝑙𝑙 − 1)� ≤ 𝛿𝛿 and |𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 (𝑙𝑙) − 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 (𝑙𝑙 − 1)| ≤ 𝛿𝛿, ∀𝑖𝑖 do

for (each and all ground stations 𝑖𝑖) do
Calculate 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 (𝑙𝑙) by Theorem 2;
Calculate 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 (𝑙𝑙) by Theorem 3;
Update 𝒳𝒳𝑖𝑖 (𝑙𝑙) by (19);
Update 𝒴𝒴(𝑙𝑙) by (20);
𝑙𝑙 + 1 → 𝑙𝑙.
end for
end while
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 (𝑙𝑙) → 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖
~

~

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 (𝑙𝑙) → 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 =

~

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖

, ∀𝑖𝑖;

𝔏𝔏 = 92.44 + 20 × log10 (𝐿𝐿) + 20 × log10 (𝑓𝑓) dB,

where 𝑓𝑓 is the system operating frequency and 𝑓𝑓 = 2 GHz. The unit of the distance 𝐿𝐿 is kilometer (km), and the
unit of the frequency is GHz in the path loss model. We assume that 𝐿𝐿 = 100 km. We consider the fast fading as
complex Gaussian distribution 𝒞𝒞𝒞𝒞 (0, 1 dB), and the Shadow model as log-normal distribution 𝒞𝒞(0, 8 dB). Unless
otherwise specified, in the simulation section, the parameters are set as in Table I. In this paper, we compare the

performance of the APT algorithm with that of the case 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 =

1
𝑁𝑁

(∀𝑖𝑖), called fixed period of transmission (FPT)

algorithm. FPT algorithm corresponds to the case that the wireless transmission of the ground stations takes
place in turn. By FPT algorithm, the ground stations occupy the satellite orbital period with an equal probability.
Moreover, we call the APT with 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min = 0, ∀𝑖𝑖, as APTZ algorithm, and the FPT with 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min = 0, ∀𝑖𝑖, as FPTZ
algorithm.
TABLE I Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
𝑁𝑁
10
𝜋𝜋
𝑉𝑉
5 × 180
𝐵𝐵
𝑅𝑅0
𝑃𝑃max

50 MHz
2 × 104 bps
50 dBW

𝐿𝐿
𝑤𝑤
𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐
𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠

105 meter
1000
1012 cycles
10−12 W/cps
10−15 W/bit

To measure the fairness of throughput among the ground stations, we use the Jains fairness metric formulated
as follows.

𝒥𝒥 =

(21)

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩

�∑𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 �
𝑁𝑁

2

𝑁𝑁 × �𝑖𝑖=1 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖2
𝑁𝑁

��

𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁

𝑁𝑁 × �

, 𝑅𝑅0 = 0,

𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
�
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min

𝑖𝑖=1

2

2

𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
�
� min
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖

, 𝑅𝑅0 ≠ 0.

In Fig. 5, we focus on the impact of 𝑅𝑅0 on the system performance. In the simulation, when several ground
stations cannot achieve its minimal throughput demand, the algorithm stops, and the throughput in this sample
is zero. We re-run the simulation in multiple channel realizations and measure the average system performance
in a long time. In Fig. 5(a), as 𝑅𝑅0 increases, APTZ outperforms APT, and FPTZ outperforms FPT, respectively. This
is because that increasing 𝑅𝑅0 reduces the feasible solution space. As 𝑅𝑅0 further increases, we find that the
throughput of APT and FPT becomes zero, because a very large 𝑅𝑅0 leads to infeasible 3C power allocation.
Besides, from Fig. 5(a), we can observe that the APT based schemes can basically achieve larger throughput than
that of the FPT based schemes. This confirms the effectiveness of the joint optimization of {𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 } and {𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 }.
In Fig. 5(b), the fairness among the ground station throughput is given. As 𝑅𝑅0 increases, the fairness goes down
because the probability that the ground stations not be served increases. In Fig. 5(c), we define 𝐺𝐺 =

𝑁𝑁 ~
1
� 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ,
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1

and we give 𝐺𝐺 under different 𝑅𝑅0 . For APT and FPT, As 𝑅𝑅0 increases, G decreases, because the larger 𝑅𝑅0 can
increase the probability that the ground stations not be served in a long time. On the other hand, the
increased 𝑅𝑅0 leads to more frequent wireless transmission of the ground stations corresponding to the
decreased 𝐺𝐺. Besides, 𝐺𝐺 = 10 for the cases of APTZ and FPTZ when 𝑅𝑅0 = 0, because 𝑁𝑁 = 10 ground stations
are assumed. However, when 𝑅𝑅0 ≠ 0, FPT possess 𝐺𝐺 < 10, because the ground stations may not be served
when the samples of the wireless channel quality is very poor, where 𝐺𝐺 = 0 in this case.

Fig. 5. The impact of 𝑅𝑅0 on the system performance. (a) The impact of 𝑅𝑅0 on the average throughput per ground
station. (b) The impact of 𝑅𝑅0 on the fairness of the ground stations. (c) The impact of 𝑅𝑅0 on 𝐺𝐺.

In Fig. 6, we focus on the impact of 𝑃𝑃max on the system performance. As in Table I, 𝑅𝑅0 = 2 × 104 bps for APT and
FPT in Fig. 6. In Fig. 6(a), as 𝑃𝑃max increases, the system throughput gradually increases. When 𝑃𝑃max is large
enough, the constraint on 𝑅𝑅0 becomes inactive, where APT is equivalent to APRZ, and FPT is equivalent to FPRZ.
This is because 𝑅𝑅0 can be achieved when 𝑃𝑃max is large enough. In Fig. 6(b), we can observe that the fairness of
the ground stations gradually increases with 𝑃𝑃max as well. This is because that the increased 𝑃𝑃max can provide the
ground stations with better service. In Fig. 6(c), as 𝑃𝑃max increases, the performance gap of G between APT and
APTZ, as well as the performance gap of 𝐺𝐺 between FPT and FPTZ gradually narrows. This is because that the
increased 𝑃𝑃max can effectively weaken the impact of 𝑅𝑅0 on the system performance. One interesting
phenomenon in Fig. 6(c) is that unlike the cases of APT, FPT, and FPTZ, 𝐺𝐺 of APTZ gradually decreases
as 𝑃𝑃max increases. This is because that when 𝑃𝑃max is relatively small, 𝐺𝐺 should be large enough to decrease
the {𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 } for meeting the power constraint in (C1). As 𝑃𝑃max increases, 𝐺𝐺 in APTZ can be decreased to increase the
corresponding {𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 } for improving the system objective in eq. (13a). It is worth mentioning that when 𝑃𝑃max is
relatively small, 𝐺𝐺 of APT is smaller than the 𝐺𝐺 of APTZ because in several samples, the system cannot meet the
constraint of 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min and stops working, where the average value of G decreases. Likewise, when 𝑃𝑃max is relatively
small, 𝐺𝐺 of FPT is smaller than the G of FPTZ. Besides, we can observe that in Fig. 6(b), unlike the cases of the
throughput and G, the fairness performance gap between the APT and APTZ, as well as the gap between the FPT
and FPTZ do not apparently decrease. This is because that the measurement of the fairness between the ground
stations depends on whether 𝑅𝑅0 = 0 as in eq. (21).

Fig. 6. The impact of 𝑃𝑃max on system performance. (a) The impact of 𝑃𝑃max on the average throughput per ground
station. (b) The impact of 𝑃𝑃max on the fairness of the ground stations. (c) The impact of 𝑃𝑃max on the average
number of circles of ground stations (𝐺𝐺) transmitting one block to the satellites.

In Fig. 7, we further explore the throughput performance with the system parameters 𝑁𝑁, 𝑉𝑉, and 𝐿𝐿. In Fig. 7(a), as
the number of ground stations 𝑁𝑁 increases, the throughput monotonously decreases. This is because that the
increased 𝑁𝑁 may activate more ground stations with poor channel quality under the constraint on 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min .
In Fig. 7(b), the impact of the minimal elevation angle of the satellite to the ground stations 𝑉𝑉 on the system
throughput performance is studied. As 𝑉𝑉 increases, the throughput performance monotonously decreases
~

because a larger 𝑉𝑉 corresponds to a smaller 𝑇𝑇. According to Lemma 2, less throughput will be obtain by the
~

same transmitting power with a the smaller 𝑇𝑇. In Fig. 7(c), as the distance between the satellite and the ground
stations 𝐿𝐿 increases, the system throughput will monotonously decreases due to a larger path loss. Another
observation in Fig. 7(c) is that the throughput performance of APT and FPT gradually approaches to each other
as 𝐿𝐿 increases. The same phenomenon also exists in the throughput performance of APTZ and FPTZ. This is
because as 𝐿𝐿 increases, the distance between the satellite and the ground stations dominates the channel gain,
which makes {𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 } equally for the ground stations. This indicates that the effectiveness of the adaptive
adjusting {𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 } gradually reduces as 𝐿𝐿 increases. The third observation in Fig. 7(c) is that as 𝐿𝐿 further increases, we
find that FPTZ outperforms APT because by FPTZ, the satellites can serve the ground stations without the
constraints of 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖min.

Fig. 7. The impact of 𝑁𝑁, 𝑉𝑉, and 𝐿𝐿 on the system throughput performance, respectively. (a) The impact of 𝑁𝑁 on
the average throughput per ground station. (b) The impact of 𝑉𝑉 on the average throughput per ground station.
(c) The impact of 𝐿𝐿 on the average throughput per ground station.

SECTION V. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the joint optimization of satellite serving period and 3C power allocation in
terrestrial-satellite systems considering user fairness and data security. Based on Nash bargaining, we improved
the throughput of users while guaranteeing fairness. Besides, we also employed blockchain to guarantee data
security. First, we divided system implementation into data accumulation, blockchain computing, and wireless
transmission. Then, we revealed the relationship between the satellite serving period and the 3C power
allocation through several theorems and lemmas. Last, we solved the Nash bargaining game based optimization
problem with 3C power constraint using dual decomposition. Through extensive simulations, we have
demonstrated the proposed optimal satellite serving period and the optimal 3C power allocation.
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